I study a career concerns model in which the principal obtains information about the agent's performance from an intermediary (evaluator), whose interests diverge from those of the principal. I show that, while the evaluator's bias leads to ex-post suboptimal decisions regarding the agent (e.g., ine¢ cient promotion or dismissal), it incentivizes the agent to exert more e¤ort. As a result, generally, a non-zero bias is optimal. The optimal bias is "anti-agent"("pro-agent") when the agent is of high value (low value) for the principal from the ex-ante perspective. The magnitude of the optimal bias is increasing in the strength of the agent's career concerns and decreasing in the degree of uncertainty about the agent's ability. I also obtain that delegating decision rights to the evaluator may be preferred to communication when a su¢ ciently large bias is required to create incentives. I discuss applications of my results to promotion policies in organizations, evaluation of government programs and evaluation of CEOs by boards of directors.
Introduction
In the traditional career concerns framework, the performance of the agent is directly observed by the principal or the market. 1 The agent bene…ts from the higher performance through a higher evaluation of his ability, which leads to a greater wage (Holmström, 1999; Jewitt, and Tirole, 1999a,b), greater chances of promotion or retention (Gibbons and Murphy, Higher School of Economics, Moscow. Email: sstepanov@hse.ru. I am very grateful to Mikhail Drugov, Guido Friebel, Sergei Guriev, Sergei Izmalkov, Tymo…y Mylovanov, Anders Olofsgård, Sergei Severinov, Giancarlo Spagnolo, seminar paricipants at Higher School of Economics (Moscow), Goethe University (Frankfurt am Main), Paris School of Economics, Stockholm Insititute of Transition Economics, participants of the 2014 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, and of the 29th European Economic Association Annual Congress for comments. 1 More generally, by those who take a decision regarding the agent, be they the agent's current boss, potential employers, or voters, depending on the speci…c setting.
1992; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999) or higher reelection probability (Persson and Tabellini, 2000, ch. 4.5), depending on the speci…c setup. In this way, career concerns create incentives for the agent to exert e¤ort.
Yet, in many real-life circumstances, information about the agent's performance is transmitted to the principal through intermediaries who do not necessarily have the same objectives as those of the principal. For example, when deciding on a promotion of an employee, the CEO of a company would rely, at least in part, on the evaluation of the employee's ability by the employee's peers or immediate boss. Because such people may be natural competitors of the employee inside the …rm, their objectives may di¤er from the one of the CEO who wants to implement the optimal allocation of people within the …rm. Another example is evaluation of a government program by an ad hoc committee (in this case, the agent is the bureaucrat implementing the program). Depending on the political stances of the committee members, its aggregate preferences may be more or less biased with respect to the principal's preferences, be it the government or the society at large. Yet another example is evaluation of a politician by a media outlet, the objectives of which may di¤er from the ones of the society. This paper introduces a biased intermediary (evaluator) in the traditional career concerns framework. Biased evaluation is similar (although not equivalent, as I show) to delegation of decision-making to a biased intermediary. In line with many works on strategic delegation, my paper …nds that delegating evaluation to a party whose ex-post preferences deviate from those of the principal can bene…t the latter from the ex-ante perspective: a biased evaluator serves as a commitment device to follow a certain ex-post policy regarding the agent in order to provide incentives to him. Thus, my paper is closely related to both career concerns and strategic delegation literatures. Yet, to my knowledge, no paper has studied strategic delegation of evaluation in a career concerns setting.
I derive several results absent in the previous literature and provide implications for a number of real-life settings. In particular I show that:
-the optimal evaluator can be tougher as well as softer on the agent relative to the principal's ex-post preferences; the direction of the bias depends on how valuable the agent is for the principal from the ex-ante perspective, -the optimal evaluator's bias is increasing in the strength of career concerns for the agent, -the optimal evaluator's bias is decreasing in the ex-ante uncertainty about the agent's ability.
I discuss implications of these results for evaluation and promotion policies in organizations, evaluation of government programs, and evaluation of CEOs by boards of directors. I also examine when delegating decision-making to the evaluator can dominate acting on information communicated by the evaluator.
In my model, the principal wants to maximize the agent's output over the two periods (with a discount factor applied to the second period). The …rst period output depends both on the agent's unobservable e¤ort and his ability, unknown to anyone. The output is non-contractible.
After the …rst period, the evaluator (but not the principal!) observes the output and makes a report to the principal. The principal forms a posterior belief about the agent's ability and takes a binary decision, regarding the agent: either "favorable" or "unfavorable". Examples of a favorable decision could be "retention", "promotion", "continuation of the agent's project", "allocation of a greater budget". Correspondingly, "dismissal", "no promotion", "termination of the agent's project", "no increase in the budget" are examples of an unfavorable decision.
The agent receives a private bene…t from the favorable decision -this is the source of his incentives to exert e¤ort.
The second period output depends on the agent's ability if the decision is favorable, but does not depend on it in the case of the unfavorable decision 2 . Hence, the principal's decision will be described by a threshold, such that the decision is favorable (unfavorable) if the principal's posterior belief about the agent's ability is above (below) the threshold.
The principal's posterior is determined both by the prior and the message he receives from the evaluator. The evaluator's ex-post preferences can be biased with respect to the principal's ones. I say that the bias is "anti-agent"when the evaluator prefers to implement the unfavorable decision more often (for a larger set of beliefs about the agent's ability) than is optimal from the principal's perspective. The opposite situation corresponds to a "pro-agent" bias. Thus, in my model, the bias can be described by the di¤erence between the evaluator's threshold on the (perceived) agent's ability, above which she would prefer the favorable decision, and the principal's one.
I assume that evaluators'messages are cheap talk. In my simple two-actions setting, equilibrium communication will be equivalent to a binary advice: "favorable"/"unfavorable". A bias in the evaluator's objectives creates incentives for her to distort information about the agent's performance. However, unless the bias is too large, the evaluator's message will be decisionrelevant for the principal in equilibrium, despite the fact that following the evaluator's advice leads to systematic errors in the direction of the bias.
Suboptimal ex-post decisions arising due to these errors are an obvious cost of a biased evaluator. From the ex-post perspective, thus, the bias should be zero. At the same time, the bias can improve the agent's incentives to exert e¤ort in the …rst period. The evaluator's preferences e¤ectively set the bar on performance that the agent needs to surpass in order to be treated favorably. The agent is discouraged from working both when it is too easy and when it is too hard to clear the bar. Hence, his e¤ort is non-monotonic in this bar and, consequently, in the evaluator's threshold on the agent's ability (because the performance bar is monotonic in the evaluator's preferences in equilibrium).
The crucial thing is that the e¤ort-maximizing evaluator's threshold is generally di¤erent from the principals' ex-post optimal threshold. These two thresholds are completely independent: the ex-post optimal threshold is not a¤ected by the agent's e¤ort, while the e¤ort-maximizing threshold does not depend on the principal's ex-post preferences. This means that a non-zero evaluator's bias is generally needed if the principal wants to maximize the agent's incentives. This, in turn, implies that the ex-ante optimal bias is also non-zero, albeit smaller in magnitude than the e¤ort-maximizing one, because it trades-o¤ ex-post e¢ ciency against e¤ort provision.
Furthermore, the optimal bias can be anti-agent as well as pro-agent. In papers on strategic delegation, the optimal bias is usually in one direction: e.g., the central bank has to be more in ‡ation-averse than the society (Rogo¤, 1985; Persson and Tabellini, 1993) , the manager needs to be more sales-oriented than the …rms'owners in a Cournot oligopoly setting (Vickers, 1985; Fershtman, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987) , a regulatory agency has to be less protectionist that the government (Ludema and Olofsgård, 2008 ).
In my model, the direction of the optimal bias is determined by the value, for the principal, of the unfavorable decision relative to the ex-ante value of the favorable one, or, to put it another way, by the ex-ante value of the agent for the principal. It turns out that the more valuable the agent is ex-ante, the more likely it is that the optimal bias is "anti-agent" rather than "proagent". A low value of the unfavorable decision means that the agent is very valuable for the principal. Then, the principal is too "lenient" to the agent ex-post, meaning that he …nds it ex-post optimal to take the unfavorable decision only if his posterior about the agent's ability is very low. For example, if the decision is about …ring versus retaining the agent, then, if there is no good alternative to the agent, the principal will …re him only if the agent is believed to be really bad. Such "leniency"results in too weak incentives for the agent. Therefore, the optimal evaluator's bias needs to be anti-agent in order to induce more e¤ort. In contrast, a too high value of the unfavorable decision makes the principal too demanding, which also discourages e¤ort. In this case, the optimal bias has to be pro-agent in order to restore incentives.
Next, I analyze the e¤ect of the strength of career concerns, by which I mean the value of the agent's discount factor (importance of the future) and/or the magnitude of the bene…ts he obtains from the favorable decision. An increase in either of these parameters leads to a greater marginal e¤ect of the bias on the agent's e¤ort. Since the optimal bias is always smaller than the e¤ort-maximizing one, there is always under-provision of e¤ort in the optimum. Consequently, an increase in the marginal e¤ect of the bias on e¤ort calls for an increase in the bias in order to induce more e¤ort. The implication of this result is that more career-concerned agents should be evaluated by more biased evaluators. Notice that this statement holds regardless of the direction of the optimal bias.
Finally, I examine the e¤ect of the ex-ante uncertainty about the agent's ability, modeled as the variance of the prior ability distribution. Under the assumptions of the normal distribution and quadratic cost of e¤ort, the conclusion is that higher ex-ante uncertainty about the agent's ability is likely to reduce the optimal bias. The key thing is that a higher variance of the ability generally reduces the sensitivity of the agent's equilibrium e¤ort to the bias, while increasing or just mildly decreasing the e¤ect of the bias on the expected loss from ex-post ine¢ cient decisions. That is, the e¤ectiveness of the bias in providing incentives diminishes, whereas the ex-post e¢ ciency remains su¢ ciently sensitive to the bias. Therefore, the bias needs to be lowered.
I also consider delegating decision-making to the evaluator as an alternative to communication. When the bias in not too large, the two modes of decision-making are equivalent in my binary model, because, in the case of communication, the principal simply follows the evaluator's preferred policy. However, when the bias is so large that the principal ignores the evaluator's message, delegation can be better than communication, despite its large ex-post inef…ciency. The reason is that decision-irrelevant communication does not induce any e¤ort, while delegation still generates some incentives even when the bias is high. This result contrasts with Dessein (2002) who showed, in a traditional Crawford-Sobel type of framework 3 , that delegation is preferred to communication only when the divergence of preferences between the principal and the expert is small enough. The di¤erence in the results is because, in my model, the mode of decision making has an e¤ect on the third party's incentives (the agent), which a¤ect the principal's welfare. about the agent's performance. In the industrial organization literature, it has been shown that 3 Crawford and Sobel (1982) owners of a …rm may bene…t from creating an incentive scheme which would make the manager more sales-oriented than the owners themselves in a Cournot oligopoly setting (Vickers, 1985; Fershtman, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987) and less sales-oriented in Bertrand oligopoly setting (Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987) . Such mechanisms allow the …rm to commit to ex-ante pro…t-maximizing strategies in the presence of strategic interactions with rivals. 4 In the political economy literature, Besley and Coate (2001) show that it may be optimal, from the median voter perspective, to elect a representative whose preferences will di¤er from those of the median voter, in order to neutralize the e¤ect of lobbies on policy choices ex-post.
In Persson and Tabellini (1994) , in order to commit to avoid excessive taxation of capital, the majority elects a policymaker with a lower preference for taxing capital (higher capital income) than that of the median voter. 5 In the monetary policy literature, a well known solution to the time-consistency problem is to delegate monetary policy to a conservative (in ‡ation-averse) central banker (Rogo¤, 1985; Persson and Tabellini, 1993) .
Similarly, in Ludema and Olofsgård (2008) , a government …nds it optimal to delegate either protection of a …rm or collecting information about the cost of protection to an agency who is less protectionist than government. Such delegation improves the investment policy of the …rm. Many papers in the principal-agent literature, e.g., on …nancial contracting, share the feature that the principal's commitment to ex-post ine¢ cient actions can induce better agent's incentives (e.g., Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Tirole, 1994, 1996; Berglöf and Von Thadden, 1994; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Hart and Moore, 1998; Crémer, 1995) .
While my paper also makes use of this idea, its application to the evaluation of career-motivated agents is novel. Among the mentioned papers, Crémer (1995) is probably closest to mine. In a setup with explicit incentives, Crémer (1995) argues that it can be optimal for the principal to commit to stay uninformed about the causes of poor agent's performance, because it creates commitment not to renegotiate with the agent. This, in turn, raises the agent's e¤ort. Essentially, in Crémer's paper, garbling information about the agent's performance helps to create incentives. This is a feature of my model too (biased evaluation generates information garbling). Dewatripont et al. (1999a) also notice that garbling of a performance measure (in a career concerns setup) may result in a higher agent's e¤ort. However, in contrast to my paper, they focus on the negative e¤ect of information garbling and apply it to show de…ciency of creating "fuzzy missions" for an agent. Gehlbach and Simpser (2015) , in a political economy setting, show that garbling information about the ruler's popularity through electoral manipulation helps the ruler to encourage bureaucrats to exert more e¤ort, because bureaucrats lose incentives when they believe that the ruler's hold on power is weak. A talented subordinate (employee) may be a threat to a division manager, who is afraid of being replaced. Friebel and Raith (2004) argue that restricting direct communication between the CEO (principal) and the employee (i.e., bypassing the division manager) can be e¢ ciency improving because then the division manager is less afraid to recruit or develop talented subordinates. In my model, evaluation of an employee by his division manager, rather than the CEO or an unbiased colleague, may bene…t the organization through improving the employee's incentives.
Other related literature
Friebel and Raith (2013) compare two promotion systems: "silo", in which junior employees can be promoted only within their initial divisions, and "lattice", in which promotions across divisions are allowed. In that paper, a well trained employee bene…ts the division manager through a higher productivity of the division. Then, a silo has a positive e¤ect on the division manager's incentives to train employees, because in a silo employees cannot me moved to another division. In my model, a silo in which the employee is evaluated by the immediate boss can be good thanks to a positive e¤ect on the employee's incentives.
Model
I will …rst present a formal model and then discuss its assumptions and applicability to various real life settings.
Players and timing
There are three players in the model: the principal (P ), the agent (A) and the evaluator (E ).
A has ability F ( ), with the density function f ( ) having full support and di¤erentiable everywhere. A priory is unknown to anyone, while F ( ) is common knowledge.
There are two periods. The sequence of actions in the …rst period is as follows:
A exerts e¤ort e at cost c(e); c 0 (0) = 0; c 0 ( ) > 0 for any e > 0; c 00 ( ) > 0 for any e A's …rst period performance is realized: y( ; e) = + e.
E (but not P ) observes y and makes a report r 2 R to P.
P takes a binary decision regarding A: "favorable" or "unfavorable".
The organization's …rst period output is realized: 1 = y.
In the second period no actions are taken, only the second period output 2 is realized:
z if P 's decision was unfavorable
Payo¤s
P 's payo¤ is 1 in period 1 and 2 in period 2. Hence, the principal's welfare is identical to the organization's payo¤. P has a discount factor between the periods. Thus, the ex-ante P 's welfare is
I assume that the agent cares only about P 's decision being favorable and the cost of e¤ort.
Speci…cally, A's payo¤ is c(e) in period 1, and in period 2 he gets ( B if P 's decision was favorable 0 if P 's decision was unfavorable B is the exogenous private bene…t the agent derives from the favorable decision. Depending on the context, it can stem from prestige, reputation (which may translate into higher wealth in the future), possibility to extract more rents at a higher position or from a larger project, etc.
The agent's discount factor is A , so his ex-ante welfare is c(e) + A B I(f avorable decision);
where I( ) is the indicator function.
Finally, E 's second payo¤ is as follows. Her …rst period payo¤ is irrelevant because she takes no decisions then, so I just ignore it. Her second period payo¤ is:
Thus, E 's ex-post preferences are similar to those of P except being biased; the bias is parametrized by b. If b > 0, we will say that the bias is "anti-agent", because the unfavorable decision is relatively more attractive for E than for P. Correspondingly, if b < 0, the bias is "pro-agent".
Let us introduce the following notation:
That is, P is the value of for which P is indi¤erent between the favorable and unfavorable decision, and E is the similar threshold for E. Thus, the bias can measured simply as the di¤erence between E and P .
Discussion of the setup 3.3.1 Basic features
This model …ts a variety of real life settings. The crucial ingredients are:
i. The principal cares about both the agent's e¤ort and the agent's ability.
ii. The principal makes a decision regarding the agent based on the past evaluation of the agent's performance.
iii. The principal's future welfare is more sensitive to the agent's ability if the principal takes a favorable decision regarding the agent.
iv. The agent receives a private bene…t from the favorable decision. setting, examples of a favorable decision could be "retention", "promotion", "continuation of the agent's project", "allocation of a greater budget". Correspondingly, "dismissal", "no promotion", "termination of the agent's project", "no increase in the budget" would be examples of an unfavorable decision.
Feature (iii) is realistic too. In the model, feature (iii) takes an extreme form: if the decision is unfavorable, the second period output does not depend on the agent's ability at all.
This …ts well a situation in which the principle decides whether to …re or to retain the agent.
However, for the results of my model, it would be enough to assume that the second period output just depends less on the agent's ability in the case of the unfavorable decision. This would be true in many settings: think, for example, of keeping the agent at a low position instead of promotion (higher rank employees are more in ‡uential), cutting the budget for the agent's project, or allocating a less important project to him. In that case, the principal's and evaluator's ex-post optimal policies would still have the threshold structure of the same type:
"take the favorable decision if and only if the estimated ability if above a certain threshold".
Consider now feature (iv). While agents sometimes receive monetary rewards from favorable decisions (e.g., promotions normally imply salary increases), they are also likely to derive various pecuniary and non-pecuniary private bene…ts, which are non-contractible. Prestige, status, high reputation raise an individual's utility both per se and because they help to increase the individual's future wealth. Moreover a favorable decision may directly imply greater control over resources, which allows extracting higher rents. In many instances, these intermediaries would not have the same preferences as the principal does. Sometimes the divergence of preferences would arise naturally: e.g., peers of an employee may be his/her competitors for a promotion, in which case their preferred decision regarding the employee would naturally di¤er from the principal's one. In other cases the bias could be purposefully created by selecting evaluators with certain preferences. For example, a CEO can be evaluated by boards with greater or lower proportion of insiders, a bureaucrat in charge of a government reform can be evaluated by a committee with greater or lower proportion of proreform members, a university's tenure committee may contain members which di¤erent views on tenure standards. The bias can also be a¤ected by reputational concerns or gender or race prejudices.
The important implicit assumption of my model is that the principal does not have access to sources of information other than the evaluator or that such sources are very costly. In particular, once the evaluator has been chosen and the agent has exerted e¤ort, the principal cannot use another evaluator. Without this assumption, the principal would fall into a commitment problem. However, I believe that this assumption is realistic: in many instances, it is di¢ cult or costly to …nd an alternative evaluator.
Let me also remark that introducing a costly alternative source of information would not be a problem for my model. Provided that the evaluator's bias is not too large, the principal would abstain from spending resources on the alternative information channel. Thus, such a modi…cation would just reduce the range of "credible biases" in equilibrium, but would not change the qualitative results.
The …nal basic feature of the setup is lack of contractibility (feature (vi)). I assume that performance y and both periods outputs 1 and 2 are non-veri…able. I also assume that E 's report m is non-contractible. Finally, I assume that P 's decision (equivalently, A's private bene…t) is non-contractible either. The complete absence of contractibility is not necessary for my results and is driven by the desire to simplify the model by keeping only one channel of incentives provision: biased evaluation. However, some su¢ cient degree of contractual imperfection is needed in the model. For example, I could allow for some contractible signal about y, but this signal would have to be noisy enough. In the Appendix I consider an extension in which I allow for contracts stipulating payments from P to A contingent on P 's decision (favorable/unfavorable). Although such payments help to provide incentives, they are costly to P. As a result, it remains optimal to have a biased evaluator.
Other assumptions
It is crucial that P needs to take his decision before 1 is observed, otherwise he could infer A's ability in equilibrium before taking a decision, and E would play no role then. I also implicitly assume that A's participation constraint is satis…ed (e.g., his reservation utility is zero), and A has no money to pay to P.
The setup was silent about the agent being able or unable to send his own message to the principal. In fact, in my setup, A's messages would have no e¤ect, because he always strictly prefers the favorable decision, and, hence, any cheap talk between him and P would be uninformative. So, ignoring this possibility is innocuous.
I also make a few technical assumptions.
Assumption 1 Distribution F ( ) is unimodal
This assumption is made for simplicity.
Assumption 2 Functions A Bf (a x) and c 0 (x) cross only once on x 2 [0; 1), for any a.
This assumption ensures that A's e¤ort is uniquely determined by the …rst-order condition, as will be clear in subsection 4.2.
As can be easily predicted, if E 's bias is too large, P will always ignore E 's messages. Such a bias cannot be optimal for it will neither result in decision-relevant communication nor create any incentives for A. Hence, for given other parameters, the set of biases which can potentially be optimal will be limited by some b min and b max . For simplicity, I make an assumption that ensures the interior solution for the optimal bias:
The meaning of this assumption is that P should not be far from the mode in order to guarantee that the optimal bias will stay moderate and, hence, will not hit the bounds. Why it is important to compare P with the mode will be clear in subsections 4.2 and 4.3.
Solution 4.1 Principal' s decision and communication
Let us assume that in the case of indi¤erence, both P and E prefer the favorable decision. 6 The principal's optimal policy is to take the favorable decision i¤
From E 's standpoint, the favorable decision should be taken i¤
For given E 's belief b e about A's choice of e¤ort, the observation of performance y allows E to infer :
Suppose E simply announces whether b < E or b E (below I will show that this is indeed the case in any equilibrium with decision-relevant communication). Such communication will be decision-relevant (that is, will a¤ect P 's decision) if and only if P 's updated belief about the agent's talent crosses P as E 's announcement changes:
where
It is straightforward that b max > 0 and b min < 0. Then (3) can be rewritten as
Lemma 1 1. When (4) holds, there always exists an equilibrium with decision-relevant communication.
All such equilibria are equivalent: E simply reports whether b < E or b E , and P "follows E's advice", i.e., takes the unfavorable decision after the former announcement and the favorable one -after the latter announcement. 
Agent' s choice of e¤ort, equilibrium, and e¤ort-maximizing bias
If (4) is not satis…ed, the agent will not exert e¤ort because he cannot a¤ect P 's perception of his ability.
Suppose now (4) is satis…ed and denote y E (b e) E + b e. The agent's incentive is to beat the performance threshold y E (b e). Given the e¤ort e and E 's belief b e, the probability of that is
Hence, A solves
Given our assumptions on c( ) and Assumption 2, the solution is uniquely determined by the …rst-order condition
Assumption 2 guarantees a unique solution to the above equation (c 0 (0) = 0 ensures that a solution exists).
In equilibrium it must be that b e = e , where e is the equilibrium e¤ort. Hence, the equilibrium e¤ort is determined by
Let us denote the e¤ort-maximizing (incentive-maximizing) E by inc . Since c 0 ( ) is a strictly increasing function, inc is the mode of the distribution of . Notice that inc does not generally coincide with P . In particular, if P < inc , then some positive b, i.e., an anti-agent bias, maximizes E 's e¤ort. If P > inc , then some negative b, i.e., a pro-agent bias, maximizes E 's e¤ort. Notice that thanks to Assumption 3, (3) (and thus (4)) is satis…ed at the mode.
The intuition behind the result that the e¤ort maximizing E is at the mode can be grasped from the following informal reasoning. If E is too low, the agent thinks in the following way:
"The performance threshold will be low, so given that my true is most likely well above E , I
can ensure passing the performance threshold with a high probability even with little e¤ort; any extra e¤ort will not add much to this probability, thus, there is no point in working harder."The agent's reasoning for very high E is similar, except that his chances of clearing the performance threshold are too low instead of too high. Only when E is close to the mode, working hard really pays o¤, because the likelihood that the agent's is close to E is very high and, thus, e¤ort strongly a¤ects the likelihood of passing the threshold.
Optimal bias
The principal's preferred value of E maximizes
t + e ( E ) + A( E )
where A( E ) is the expression in the square brackets, and t is the unconditional expectation E( ). The …rst order condition with respect to E yields
The principal's trade-o¤ is simple. If he only cared about the e¤ort maximization, he would choose E so that de =d E = 0, i.e., E = inc . Alternatively, if P cared solely about the ex-post e¢ ciency, he would maximize A( E ), which implies setting E = P , or, equivalently, b = 0.
Since P cares about both, optimal E will be between inc and P :Thus, the optimal bias trades o¤ provision of incentives against optimality of ex-post decisions. Let us denote optimal E by W and the optimal bias by b W . Notice that thanks to Assumption 3, (3) (and thus (4)) is satis…ed at W .
Proposition 1
The ex-ante optimal bias is generally non-zero. It has the same direction as the e¤ ort-maximizing bias, but is smaller in magnitude. Figure 1 illustrates the proposition. This proposition is the …rst important result of this work. It establishes the general optimality of biased evaluation in a career concerns framework and illustrates the trade-o¤ that determines the optimal bias. we could again achieve the same result with an unbiased evaluator by conditioning the decision on reported ; yet, again, P 's commitment not to renegotiate would be necessary.
The evaluator's bias serves as a commitment device to take ex-post suboptimal decisions in order to induce e¤ort provision. The optimally biased evaluator garbles information about the agent's performance in a way that makes the principal take biased ex-post decisions optimal from the ex-ante perspective. This result parallels the argument by Crémer (1995) . In a setup with explicit incentives and contractible performance, Crémer (1995) shows that it can be optimal for the principal to commit to stay uninformed about the causes of poor agent's performance in order to avoid renegotiation. This is a mechanism to create greater incentives for the agent in his model. Thus, the role of biased evaluation in my model is similar to the role of commitment to stay uninformed in Crémer (1995) .
In the Appendix I consider an extension of the model in which I allow for contracts stipulating payments from P to A contingent on P 's decision. Although such payments help to provide incentives, they are costly to P. As a result, it remains optimal to have a biased evaluator.
Comparative statics
Let us now examine how various parameters a¤ect the optimal bias. I will focus on four things:
i. The value (to P ) of the unfavorable decision relative to the ex-ante (expected) value of the favorable decision. That is, I will be looking at z for a …xed distribution of the agent's ability. This is the same as analyzing shifts in the ability distribution relative to z. Thus, the question can restated as "what is the e¤ect of the ex-ante value of the agent?"
ii. The importance of the future for P
iii. The strength of career concerns for A (his discount factor and the bene…ts he receives from the favorable decision)
iv. Ex-ante uncertainty about A's ability (i.e., the variance of the ability distribution)
The value of the unfavorable decision (inverse of the ex-ante "value" of the agent)
The unfavorable decision is valuable for P relative to the favorable one from the ex-ante perspective whenever z is high.
First, for small enough z, P z will be below the mode, i.e., below inc : Since W lies between P and inc , for su¢ ciently small z the optimal bias must be positive (anti-agent).
Analogously, for high enough z, the optimal bias must be negative (pro-agent).
What is the marginal e¤ect of z? Consider (9). Suppose z goes up. Then E increases too, because E z + b. Since W is the point where W is maximized, function dW=d E is sloping downwards around W , implying that dW=d E becomes negative. This means that b must be decreased in order to restore dW=d E = 0 (a decline in b both decreases E directly and shifts dW=d E upwards).
Thus, a rise in the value of the unfavorable decision leads to a decrease in the absolute value of the optimal bias if the bias was positive (i.e., the bias becomes less anti-agent) and to an increase in the absolute value of the optimal bias if it was negative (i.e., the bias becomes less pro-agent).
Thus, we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When the agent is of high value for the principal from the ex-ante perspective (equivalently, the value of the unfavorable decision is small), the optimal bias is anti-agent. As the ex-ante value of the agent falls (equivalently, the value of the unfavorable decision grows), the optimal bias monotonically decreases until it becomes pro-agent. A further decrease in the ex-ante value of the agent (an increase in the value of the unfavorable decision) leads to an increase in the pro-agent bias.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. A low value of the unfavorable decision means that P is below the mode. This results in too weak incentives for the agent if E is unbiased.
At the same time, the marginal ex-post e¢ ciency loss from making the bias slightly positive is zero at E = P . So, the optimal bias has to be positive. An increase in the value of the unfavorable decision moves P closer to the mode, which increases A's incentives and reduces the marginal e¤ect of the bias on A's incentives for any given bias. This results in a smaller optimal bias. At some point P = E = inc , and further growth of z pushes P to the right of the mode. The incentives fall at P , calling for a pro-agent bias in the optimum (b < 0). What happens to the right of the mode is just a "mirror image"of the e¤ects to the left of the mode. Figure 2 illustrates the proposition.
In short, this analysis suggests that the evaluator has to be "anti-agent" when the agent is ex-ante very valuable to the principal or there is no good alternative to the agent, and "proagent" when the ex-ante value of the agent is rather low or there exists a good alternative to the agent. Figure 2 . E¤ect of the value of the unfavorable decision.
Importance of the future and the strength of career concerns
The principal's discount factor has a straightforward e¤ect: an increase in results in a lower optimal bias. This follows almost immediately from (9) and is natural: a higher weight of the future makes ex-post e¢ ciency more important than incentives.
Proposition 3
The importance of the future for the principal reduces the optimal bias.
The e¤ect of an increase in A's discount factor is not that obvious. As it follows from (6), an increase in A induces greater e¤ort. Yet we are interested in the marginal e¤ects of the bias on the e¤ort and ex-post e¢ ciency. Looking at (6) one can notice that A ampli…es the e¤ect of E (hence, the bias) on e . Since c 0 (e ) is an increasing function, f 0 ( E ) > 0 implies de =d E > 0, and then, clearly, de =d E grows with A . Similarly, if f 0 ( E ) < 0, then de =d E < 0, and de =d E falls with A .
Hence, if the optimal bias was anti-agent (
up near the optimum, implying that W and, hence, the bias increase (dW=d E is sloping downwards near W ). If the optimal bias was pro-
, then an increase in A shifts dW=d E down near the optimum, implying that W decreases. The optimal bias in this case is negative and decreases, which implies that the magnitude of the bias grows.
Since the private bene…ts, B, enter (6) in the same way as A , their e¤ect is exactly the same. Both B and A re ‡ect the strength of career concerns for the agent.
Proposition 4
The strength of career concerns for the agent increases the absolute value of the optimal bias.
The intuition behind this proposition is rather simple. The role of the bias in this model is to generate incentives. Since the absolute value of the optimal bias is always smaller than the e¤ort-maximizing one (unless P is at the mode), there is always under-provision of e¤ort in the optimum. Hence, when the marginal e¤ect of the bias on incentives grows, it is optimal to increase the magnitude of the bias.
The implication of this result is that more career-concerned agents should be evaluated by more biased evaluators, other things being equal. It might be tempting to conclude that, since younger agents are presumably more concerned about their future careers, the evaluator should be particularly biased (either unfriendly or friendly) to young agents. Yet, at the same time, there is usually more uncertainty about the talent of younger agents. Therefore, we cannot make such a statement without examining the e¤ect of the uncertainty about the agent's ability, to which we turn now.
Uncertainty about the agent' s ability
The uncertainty can be naturally modeled through an increase in the variance of the prior ability distribution. Let us look at (9) . What does an increase in the variance imply for the marginal e¤ects of the bias on the e¤ort and ex-post e¢ ciency? Consider …rst the e¤ect on the marginal ex-post loss, f ( E )b. The variance of F ( ) does not have a uniform e¤ect on f ( ).
If we take a symmetric unimodal distribution, e.g., the Gaussian one, the variance lowers f ( ) around the mode and raises f ( ) at the tails (see Figure 3) . So, the marginal e¤ect of b on the ex-post e¢ ciency in the optimum depends on where W lies.
Consider now de =d E . The e¤ort is determined by (6), using which we can write
Here also the e¤ect of the variance is ambiguous. Assume, for simplicity, that c 00 ( ) is a constant (c( ) is quadratic). The magnitude of f 0 ( ) does not generally change uniformly with the variance. Take again the Gaussian distribution and consider the case when P is smaller than the mode. f 0 ( ) decreases with the variance close to the mode but increases at the tails.
Thus, for an arbitrary distribution of the agent's ability, the e¤ect of the uncertainty is
ambiguous. Yet, in the case of the normal distribution and the quadratic cost of e¤ort, the conclusion turns out to be unambiguous. In such a case, a higher variance of the ability reduces the sensitivity of A's e¤ort to the bias, while increasing or just relatively mildly decreasing the e¤ect of the bias on the expected loss from ex-post ine¢ cient decisions.
Proposition 5
When the agent's ability is normally distributed, and the cost-of-e¤ ort function is quadratic, higher ex-ante uncertainty about the agent's ability reduces the magnitude of the optimal bias.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, if there is high uncertainty about the agent's talent, (too) biased evaluation is bad: it
has a small e¤ect on incentives, while increasing the ex-post loss. Yet, it needs to be examined to what extent this result is robust to the assumptions about the distribution of the ability and the cost of e¤ort function.
f(θ)
θ Figure 3 . Increase in the variance of the ability distribution.
Communication versus delegation
In this section I discuss the possibility of delegating decision-making to the evaluator. For the start, let us abstract from the optimal bias and simply look whether delegation can improve over communication for a given bias. Clearly, for b min b < b max , delegation is equivalent to communication. This is because under communication P always takes E 's preferred decision.
What if b is outside this range? We know from Lemma 1 that no decision-relevant communication occurs in such a case. Consequently, the agent cannot in ‡uence P 's decision by working harder and, therefore, exerts zero e¤ort. P takes his decision based on the prior.
What if we delegate decision-making to E ? This will hurt ex-post e¢ ciency: the mere fact that E 's messages would be ignored if she announced whether lied below or above E under communication implies that P is worse o¤ letting E choose her preferred actions rather than relying on the prior. Yet, delegation improves e¤ort provision, because now A has to surpass a certain performance threshold in order to deserve the favorable decision (he actually solves the same problem as in subsection 4.2).
It is easy to invent a situation in which the ex-ante P 's welfare is improved: one just need to set P 's discount factor low enough so that ex-post e¢ ciency is relatively unimportant. More generally, on the basis of the above discussion, we can formulate the following proposition. Switching to delegation in such cases allows to ignore the bounds and set the bias e¢ ciently, because delegation ensures commitment to E 's preferred decisions. Thus, the factors that increased the optimal bias in the basic model would also make delegation more likely to be preferred to communication. 
Applications
In reality incentives of agents are a¤ected not just by career concerns, but also by other factors, notably by contracts relating rewards to performance. So, one needs to be careful when applying my model to real-life settings: it is more safely applied to setups in which explicit contracts are not used or are rather imperfect due to lack or noisiness of contractible performance measures.
The …rst two applications are discussed informally, whereas for the third one I apply some formal analysis.
Evaluation of governmental reforms or programs
A government o¢ cial who failed an important project (reform or program) is likely to su¤er a reputation loss and face meagre career prospects. In contrast, success of the project implies a reputation gain and good chances for career advancement. Thus, the bureaucrat in charge of the project clearly gets a bene…t from a positive evaluation of the project's outcome (or the project's progress in the case of interim evaluation). Success of the project would naturally depend on the bureaucrat's ability. The principal here is the government or the society at large, which bene…ts from promoting or allocating important tasks to talented bureaucrats. Thus,
given that bureaucrats rarely have explicit incentives, this setup …ts my model well.
The government can delegate evaluation of the project's success to a special committee.
Provided that the project is not politically neutral, the committee's bias will be determined by the political preferences of its members. Arguably, most reforms or programs are not politicallyneutral in the sense that di¤erent political parties have di¤erent attitude to these projects. 7 Thus, the evaluator's bias can be regulated by varying the committee's composition.
The favorable decision would be the decision to continue/not to reverse/not to change substantially the project, perhaps together with some decisions favoring the bureaucrat in charge of the project personally, such as a promotion or allocating a new important task. Correspondingly, the unfavorable decision would be the decision to terminate/reverse/change substantially the project, perhaps together with some personal unfavorable decisions regarding the bureaucrat, such as dismissal.
Thus the expected value for the government of the unfavorable decision relative to the favorable one will be greater, the lower are the ex-ante chances of the project's success and the lower are the costs of terminating or reversing the project. Consequently, as Proposition 2 implies, reforms that have ex-ante low likelihood of success and/or are easy to reverse or terminate should be evaluated by committees whose members are on average pro-reform politically. In contrast, reforms with ex-ante high chances for success and substantial costs of reversal or termination should be evaluated by su¢ ciently anti-reform committees.
Evaluation of CEOs by corporate boards
There has been a long-standing debate on the optimal proportion of independent directors in a corporate board (see, e.g., Adams et al., 2010) . My model provides additional considerations on this issue. Altering the board composition one could make the board either more or less tough on the CEO, which would a¤ect the board's decision whether to …re the CEO after poor performance. A reduction in the fraction of independent directors and/or an increase in the proportion of insiders on board raises the friendliness of the board to the CEO. Appointing directors with reputation of being intolerant to failing CEOs makes the board less CEO-friendly and, possibly, even tougher than the …rm's shareholders would be (corresponding to an "antiagent bias" in my model).
Of course, in reality CEO incentives are shaped in a much more complex way than just via a threat of dismissal. In particular, there are contracts relating CEO remuneration to various measures of performance. 8 Yet, boards do take dismissal decisions, and, arguably, a CEO su¤ers a substantial loss of private bene…ts from being …red. Thus, though I cannot derive any de…nitive conclusions without a more complete model of CEO incentives, my model provides some arguments on the optimal board composition. To the extent that the threat of dismissal plays a role in CEOs'incentives, these arguments, I believe, have a value.
First, …rms whose CEOs have proven to be extremely talented (superstar CEOs) should have CEO-unfriendly boards. 9 This conclusion follows from Proposition 2: there is a relatively low expected value from replacing a talented CEO. Whether the board's bias has to be large or not is ambiguous a priory. On the one hand, there is low uncertainty once a CEO has proven his skills. Then, Proposition 5 tells us that the bias should be large. On the other hand, a superstar CEO may have weak career concerns, which implies that the bias should be small, by Proposition 4.
In contrast, other things being equal (strength of career concerns, in particular), a CEO with a short track record of performance should be evaluated by an unbiased ("balanced") board,
i.e., not too tough, not too friendly, because of the high uncertainty about the manager's ability (Proposition 5).
Finally, turnaround CEOs in highly troubled companies may need to be evaluated by friendly boards due to a relatively high outside option of liquidating the company (value of z).
Promotions in organizations
When the head of an organization decides on promotion of an employee, he often relies on information from the employee's immediate superior or colleagues. While such people are naturally most informed about the potential promotee's ability, they may also be natural competitors/rivals of him. Then, their evaluations are likely to be biased. Should the principal try to establish less biased channels of evaluation/design a promotion scheme less dependent on opinions of employees with vested interests?
I will now present a formal application of my model to analyzing such questions. Although the below analysis is far from comprehensive, it provides a couple of insights and demonstrates how my framework can be applied for analyzing the internal labor market. 8 Furthermore, subjective board decisions are not just about …ring or retaining a CEO: the board may reduce or increase a bonus in a given year or change the remuneration scheme altogether. 9 One may say that this conclusion contradicts the reality: boards seem friendly to superstar CEOs as they rarely challenge decisions of or dismiss such CEOs. However, …rst of all, arrangements that are optimal from the shareholders' perspective should not necessarily arise in reality. Second, according to my model, an optimally biased (anti-CEO) board would …re a superstar CEO just more often that is ex-post optimal, but such events would still occur rarely because a very talented agent would most likely clear the performance bar even when it is set by the (ex-ante optimal) anti-agent evaluator.
Adjusted model
Let us consider a hierarchy with the head of the organization (Principal, P ), a middle manager (Manager, M ) and an Agent (A). M observes A's performance and reports it to P. Hence, the manager is the evaluator in this example. P then takes a replacement/promotion decision:
whether to promote A to the M 's position, in which case the current manager is assumed to be demoted. 10 The timing is the same as in the basic model, but I adjust the output and payo¤ functions to capture the speci…cs of this particular setting. In particular, the 1-st period output now is
where y = + e as before, and m is M 's ability, which is common knowledge for simplicity. 11
The 2-nd period output is A's payo¤ in period 2 is
Thus, I assume, for simplicity, that A cares only about being promoted, but not about the organization's welfare. 12 Despite the modi…cations, the analysis is essentially the same as in the basic model. The favorable decision yields + (1 )m to P, while the unfavorable one results in m + (1 ) .
1 0 Alternatively, I could assume that M is …red with a certain probability. 1 1 It is natural to assume that more is known about the manager's ability, who presumably has worked longer in the organization, compared to the agent. Also, because the focus in on the agent's incentives, I am assuming here, for simplicity, that the manager's e¤ort plays no role. 1 2 The conclusions would not change if I assumed that A cared about the organization's payo¤ too.
Since > 1=2, P prefers to promote A whenever his belief about exceeds m, i.e.:
Hence,
is the measure of the bias, which is always positive in this example ( > 1=2).
For given E , A's e¤ort choice and the equilibrium are determined exactly as in subsection 4.2, i.e.,
P 's ex-ante welfare is
where A is the expression in braces.
This expression is essentially the same as expression (7) . So, if we could freely alter E independently of B, we would obtain the …rst order condition analogous to (8) or (9):
In this example E can be varied by changing, e.g., B or x. In the former case, however, B also a¤ects the e¤ort directly, not just through E (see (10) ); thus, di¤erentiating P 's welfare with respect to B is not equivalent to di¤erentiating it with respect to E . In either case, since
x and B are restricted to be positive, an interior solution would not be guaranteed.
Whereas considering e¤ects of B and x may make sense, I would like to discuss here the choice of the bias (or of E ) through the choice of the evaluation and promotion scheme. I will call the scheme I have just described (evaluation by the immediate boss and promotion to the boss' place) the "biased scheme". The bias in these scheme is always anti-agent. It can be compared to two alternative schemes, characterized by zero bias. I called them "unbiased schemes": i. A is evaluated by people who have no con ‡ict of interest regarding A's promotion (e.g., by colleagues from a parallel division who do not compete with A for promotion or by P himself),
ii. A is still evaluated by his immediate boss, but is promoted to a position in another department.
The choice of the bias is thus discrete, so we will not be able to use di¤erentiation, but the general intuition from the basic model still applies (if you look at Figure 2 , we are simply comparing the point where E = P with some point to the right of P ). 13 Generally, factors that called for a greater anti-agent bias in the basic model will make the biased scheme more likely to be preferred here. In contrast, factors that either called for a low bias or a pro-agent bias will make the unbiased scheme preferred (clearly if the optimal bias is pro-agent, then zero bias is preferred to an anti-agent bias).
E¤ect of middle managers'skills
The value of the "unfavorable"decision is increasing with M 's talent, so we can draw a relationship between the quality of managers and optimality of various evaluation schemes. Building on the result of Proposition 2, the biased scheme is more likely to be optimal whenever keeping the status quo ("unfavorable decision" in the terminology of the basic model) is relatively unattractive, i.e., when m is su¢ ciently smaller than the mode of the distribution of .
When m is above the mode, a pro-agent bias would be optimal, but we do not have such a scheme here. Yet, in this case, zero bias is better than an anti-agent bias, so an unbiased scheme is preferred.
One can argue that normally m is rather high compared to the average (and, most likely, to the mode), because in order to become a manager one needs to prove that his talent is above the average. Thus, normally, an unbiased scheme should be optimal.
Yet, with time a manager's skills can deteriorate (e.g., due to age) or become obsolete in a changing environment. This is especially likely to happen when an organization goes through a period of transformation that makes skills or business approaches of incumbent managers obsolete and, hence, needs new blood at the managerial level. Then we are in the case of low m, and, according to my results, the biased scheme should be optimal. That is, in such circumstances, junior employees should be evaluated by "dead wood" managers from the same division and should be restricted from promotions to a di¤ erent division. This is a quite surprising conclusion.
E¤ect of private bene…ts from a managerial position
From Proposition 4 we know that greater strength of career concerns calls for a higher optimal bias. At the same time, high B in this example means not just stronger career concerns but also a greater bias of the biased scheme. Thus, if the biased scheme initially dominates the unbiased schemes su¢ ciently strongly, a change in B will not alter the dominance. Similarly, if the unbiased schemes clearly dominates the biased one, changing B will have no e¤ect on the choice of the scheme. Yet, if the preference for one of the schemes is initially slight, the e¤ect of B is ambiguous. Suppose, for example, that the biased scheme was only slightly preferred.
This means that actually the optimal bias is lower than the one induced by the biased scheme (if we could somehow reduce the bias without changing the agent's private bene…t, we would do that). Let us raise B. Stronger career concerns would call for a higher optimal bias if we could set any bias we wanted. But the bias of the biased scheme was already too high, and a further increase in the bias due to an increase in B may actually tilt our preference towards an unbiased scheme. Further investigation of this question is needed. the Principal can also be optimal. When it is, the reason is also related to the fact that the Manager is afraid of being replaced. However, the mechanism is totally di¤erent. In contrast to Friebel and Raith (2004) , the Manager's fear plays a positive role, because it induces the Agent to work harder.
Friebel and Raith (2013) compare two promotion systems: "silo", in which junior employees can be promoted only within their initial divisions, and "lattice", in which promotions across divisions are allowed. In their paper, a well trained employee (Agent) bene…ts the Manager through a higher productivity of the division (there is no threat of replacement in that model, managerial departures are exogenous). Then, a silo has a positive e¤ect on the Manager's incentives to train employees, because in a silo employees cannot me moved to another division.
In my model, a silo in which the employee is evaluated by the immediate boss can be good thanks to a positive e¤ect on the employee's incentives to work hard.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that evaluation of an agent by a biased intermediary can be optimal in a career concerns setting and proposed a framework, based on the trade-o¤ between ex-post e¢ ciency and incentives, which one can apply to study the optimal bias. The optimal bias (both the direction and the magnitude) is determined by the ex-ante value of the agent to the principal, the weight of the future in the principal's objective function, the strength of the agent's career concerns, and the uncertainty about the agent's ability. Thus, analyzing various applications in detail could be one direction for future work. Another direction could be incorporating dynamics in the model. If one thinks of an "internal labor market" in an organization or government, favorable or unfavorable decisions a¤ect the distribution of talent across di¤erent levels of the organization, which in turn a¤ects the incentives of both evaluatees and evaluators (when the latter are also the organization's employees, like in subsection 7.3). Thus, one could potentially study the evolution of the talent distribution in an organization and, perhaps, the evolution of the general "quality" of the organization.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
In any equilibrium in which P takes into account E 's messages (decision-relevant communication), the following must hold:
First, E 's strategy must be equivalent to sending binary messages ("yes"/"no"). For any b , E prefers either the favorable or unfavorable decision (for simplicity, we assumed that in the case of indi¤erence, which is a zero-measure event, E prefers the favorable decision). So, if there were three or more messages, all having di¤erent e¤ects on P 's decision, E would only use the two that would lead to the highest and the lowest probability of taking the favorable decision.
Second, for the same reason, E will never mix between the messages.
Third, the communication strategy must have a threshold structure with a single threshold E such that E says "no" for b < E and "yes" otherwise. A single threshold follows from the fact that if E prefers the favorable decision for some 0 , she will prefer it for any > 0 ; the same is true for the unfavorable decision. The threshold must obviously be E , for if it were e 6 = E , that would mean that E plays suboptimally for s between e 6 = E . Now, in order for P to …nd it optimal to follow E 's messages it must be that the messages move his belief from the left of P to the right and the vice versa. This condition is exactly (4).
So, we proved the …rst part of the lemma.
The proof of the second part is straightforward. Suppose (4) does not hold, but there is an equilibrium with decision-relevant communication. Then, from the proof of the …rst part, we know that E 's strategy is binary with threshold E . But then, since (4) does not hold, P will ignore E 's messages, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Assume the cost of e¤ort is e 2 =2: Then (6) becomes
and (9) becomes
In the case of the normal distribution Extension: optimal bias when monetary rewards for the favorable decision are allowed.
Suppose P can credibly promise to reward A in the case of the favorable decision. Let the reward be x 0. Let us assume for simplicity that the reward cannot be renegotiated. Because
x is a loss for P, his ex-post optimal threshold for the favorable decision becomes i.e., the same problem as before except that his bene…t from the favorable decision is B + x instead of just B.
Thus, the equilibrium e¤ort will be determined by
which is analogous to (6) . Since now we will be optimizing with respect to both b and x, let us rewrite this condition as
P chooses x and b so as to maximize where e (b; B; x) is the solution to (13) . Notice that when the favorable decision is taken P obtains x rather than as before. Notice also that x increases the probability of the unfavorable decision.
If we assume an interior solution for both x and b, the …rst order conditions yield: 
Notice, however, that an interior solution for x will not always exist. Consider the case when is very large so that P is concerned almost exclusively with ex-post e¢ ciency, and e x (b; B; x) and e b (b; B; x) can almost be ignored. Then, from (15) b is very close to zero, which is natural in such a case. But then, the term in the square brackets in (14) becomes almost (1 F (z + x)), and the whole derivative dW=dx is negative regardless of x. That means that the solution for
x is not interior, x = 0 in such a case.
This reasoning already shows that for large enough , monetary rewards will not be used, and the optimal bias will be determined precisely as in the basic model, i.e., it will generally be non-zero, though rather small. Let us show now that even when optimal x is positive, optimal b is still generally di¤erent from zero.
So, suppose the solution is interior for both b and x. Assume that F ( ) is Gaussian with mean t and standard deviation , and c(e) = e 2 =2. Then, using the fact that for the normal distribution f 0 ( ) = t 2 f ( ), we can obtain that (14) and (15) 
Now, suppose b = 0. Then, from (17) we have z + x + b = t. Then, given that F (t) = 1=2, 
